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- Hayden is a PhD Candidate at the Australian National University. His research focuses on the problems of infinite eth... moreHayden is a PhD Candidate at the Australian National University. His research focuses on the problems of infinite ethics - in particular, if cosmology tells us that our universe is infinite (with infinite amounts of anything we might consider valuable), how a consequentialist might still compare outcomes. Hayden was formerly a researcher at the Centre for Effective Altruism. He also enjoys terrible puns.edit
In this paper, we discuss Iason Gabriel's recent piece on criticisms of effective altruism. Many of the criticisms rest on the notion that effective altruism can roughly be equated with utilitarianism applied to global poverty and health... more
In this paper, we discuss Iason Gabriel's recent piece on criticisms of effective altruism. Many of the criticisms rest on the notion that effective altruism can roughly be equated with utilitarianism applied to global poverty and health interventions which are supported by randomised control trials and disability-adjusted life year estimates. We reject this characterisation and argue that effective altruism is much broader from the point of view of ethics, cause areas, and methodology. We then enter into a detailed discussion of the specific criticisms Gabriel discusses. Our argumentation mirrors Gabriel's, dealing with the objections that the effective altruist community neglects considerations of justice, uses a flawed methodology, and is less effective than its proponents suggest. Several of the criticisms do not succeed, but we also concede that others involve issues which require significant further study. Our conclusion is thus twofold: the critique is weaker than suggested, but it is useful insofar as it initiates a philosophical discussion about effective altruism and highlights the importance of more research on how to do the most good.
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Consequentialist moral theories, typically characterised as aiming to maximise the total of some good in the world, have enjoyed wide acceptance over the past 200 years of the analytic tradition. Despite this, when paired with the... more
Consequentialist moral theories, typically characterised as aiming to maximise the total of some good in the world, have enjoyed wide acceptance over the past 200 years of the analytic tradition. Despite this, when paired with the infinitude of spacetime that is predicted by modern cosmology, it has been argued by Quentin Smith that some forms of consequentialism imply moral nihilism, specifically those endorsing global moral realism. In this paper I extend this argument to cover all theories traditionally considered as consequentialist – those that satisfy the principles of evaluative, total, maximising consequentialism. I also respond to objections raised against Smith by Almeida and consider various modified theories intended to overcome the problem, though I show that these modifications all sacrifice essential characteristics of consequentialism such as equal consideration and agent-neutrality. Thus, it will be shown that, in our infinite universe, consequentialism must either imply nihilism or otherwise fail to actually be consequentialist.
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The common sense and folk view of causation holds that causation is something real in the world, independent of us as observers. A number of philosophers have also supported a causal realist view, based on strong intuitions about the... more
The common sense and folk view of causation holds that causation is something real in the world, independent of us as observers. A number of philosophers have also supported a causal realist view, based on strong intuitions about the nature of the world. This comes under attack from both Hume and Russell, with the latter advocating a complete elimination of causal notions. In this paper, I will attempt to outline a causal realist theory which overcomes the opposing arguments. Unfortunately though, this theory, and any tenable such theory which overcomes those objections, requires commitment to an overwhelmingly unappealing metaphysical picture.